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11.1  Introduction 
Most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in 
disarray. At the time, persistent deficits pushed up public-debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Still, some countries proved more successful than others in keeping their public 
finances under control. In recent literature it has been argued that this variation 
in cross-country fiscal experiences cannot be explained on purely economic 
grounds, or as a result of the timing of recessions, as implied by Barro’s (1979) 
tax-smoothing theory. Variations in  political and institutional arrangements 
that affect national policy formation might help explain cross-country differ- 
ences in fiscal policies pursued. This line of research has emphasized political 
instability, government structure, and electoral systems as potential determi- 
nants of budget deficits (see Alesina and Perotti 1995b for a review). For in- 
stance, Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) have argued that the type of government 
in power is very important in explaining debt policies in OECD countries. 
These authors found that large coalition governments had higher deficits, other 
things being equal, than one-party, majoritarian governments. However, subse- 
quent research found less support for this so-called weak-government hypothe- 
sis. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) argue, for instance, that the political cohesion 
variable used by  Roubini and Sachs captures the effects of  minority govern- 
ments rather than majority coalition governments. De Haan and Sturm (1994, 
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1997) found support for neither the Roubini-Sachs hypothesis nor the position 
expressed by Edin-Ohlsson. Borrelli and Royed (1995) also dismiss the weak- 
government hypothesis.  However, Alesina and Perotti  (1 995a) conclude that 
coalition governments are less successful in adjusting public finances than one- 
party governments. 
Another institutional factor that has been pointed out as a potential determi- 
nant of cross-country  variation in fiscal policy is budget institutions, that is, 
the procedures that lead to the formulation, approval, and implementation of 
the budget (Alesina et al. 1996).  Various authors have analyzed the importance 
of  budget  rules  and institutions  on the basis  of  U.S.  state experience with 
balanced-budget rules and on the U.S. federal experience with antideficit rules 
(see Poterba  1996 for a review). There are also various studies that compare 
budget outcomes in nations with different fiscal institutions. It is quite remark- 
able that the international studies conclude that budget institutions are impor- 
tant. The two aspects that have received most attention in this line of research 
are the degree of  centralization  or authority  in the budget  process,  and the 
degree of budget transparency (Poterba 1996). 
On the basis of a survey under the member states of the European Union, 
von Hagen  (1992) has developed  two  sets of  indicators  for the strength of 
budgetary procedures in these countries. The so-called structural indices per- 
tain to testing the hypothesis that fiscal discipline is enhanced by budget proce- 
dures in which the prime minister or the minister of finance has a strong posi- 
tion;  in which  universalism, reciprocity,  and parliamentary  amendments are 
limited; and that  facilitate  strict execution  of  the budget  law. The so-called 
long-term planning constraint indices pertain to testing the hypothesis that the 
more budgetary decisions are tied to a multiperiod fiscal program, the greater 
will be the degree of fiscal stability achieved. On the basis of simple bivariate 
regressions von Hagen reports strong support for the structural hypothesis, but 
the role of  long-term  constraints  is not  found to be significant. Von  Hagen 
and Harden (1  994) also use these indices to evaluate the link between budget 
processes and sustainability of fiscal policy. They report a significant correla- 
tion between their sustainability measures and the structural index. Similarly, 
the long-term constraint index is positively  correlated with the sustainability 
measure with a six-year time horizon; for the eight-year horizon this is true 
only if Luxembourg is left out. 
As pointed out by Poterba (1996), international research is more likely to be 
affected by omitted variables that are correlated with both budget institutions 
and fiscal priorities than cross-state analysis. There is, however, also evidence 
that even if  other variables  are included, budgetary  institutions  still exert a 
significant influence on fiscal policy outcomes.  De Haan  and Sturm (1994) 
have used an index based on all the information that von Hagen provided in a 
similar model as employed by Roubini and Sachs (1989b) and find that it still 
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countries. However, the importance of budgetary institutions is much less than 
suggested by simple bivariate regressions. 
In a similar vein, Alesina et al. (1  996) conclude that centralized and trans- 
parent procedures have  been associated with more fiscal discipline in Latin 
America in the eighties and early nineties. Centralized procedures are those 
that, for example, limit the role of the legislature and attribute a strong role to 
the Treasury minister in the budget process. 
There is one potential problem with this literature (Poterba 1996). Budget 
institutions may be endogenous, that is, to use them as an explanatory variable 
it is necessary that the institutions cannot be changed easily as a result of cur- 
rent or past fiscal outcomes. Riker (1980) argues that political institutions re- 
flect the “congealed preferences” of the electorate. In other words, institutions 
that do not suit a majority of the electorate will be overturned. Still, one could 
argue that changing budget institutions is not that easy and there are costs 
involved with revising fiscal rules (Alesina and Perotti, chap. 1 in this volume). 
There are various ways to deal with the endogeneity problem (Poterba 1996). 
The first one is to control for some measure of voter preferences. De Haan and 
Sturm (1994) include a proxy for the political color of the government in their 
regressions and find that budgetary procedures are still relevant in explaining 
fiscal policy. A second approach involves analyzing the evolution of budget 
rules and examining the causes and impact of procedural changes. This is the 
approach pursued in the present paper. 
Another unresolved issue is the question of which features of budget institu- 
tions are the most important in influencing fiscal policy (Poterba 1996). The 
indicators of von Hagen (1992) and of Alesina et al. (1996) broadly focus on 
similar aspects. Alesina et al. (1996) conclude for their sample of Latin Ameri- 
can countries that the two components not significantly related to fiscal perfor- 
mance are those referring to transparency and, in particular, the role of  the 
minister of  finance. In the present paper we follow a similar approach, using 
the information provided by von Hagen-Harden for the EU member states.’ 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines 
our methodology. The third section presents an analysis of aspects of budgetary 
procedures in EU member states. In the fourth section the experience of some 
countries (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden) is analyzed in detail. These 
countries show very diverging developments in their public-debt-to-GDP  ratio. 
1. Von  Hagen (1992) distinguishes between two groups of (overlapping) indices, namely the 
so-called structural indices (focusing on the position of the minister of finance, the presence of 
constraints, the role of parliament in the budget process, the transparency of the budget, and the 
flexibility in the execution phase) and the so-called long-term constraint indices (focusing on 
multiannual fiscal programs, the informativeness of the budget, the amendment powers of parlia- 
ment, and the flexibility in the execution phase). Von  Hagen and Harden (1996) present both 
additive and multiplicative versions of their index of “centralization” of the budget process. The 
two methods of  aggregation lead to very similar results, suggesting that lack of similar degrees of 
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On the basis of a case study approach, we examine whether (and why) budget- 
ary institutions have changed and whether this has affected fiscal policy out- 
comes. The final section offers some concluding comments. 
11.2  Methodology 
The focus of this paper is on changes in and aspects of budgetary proce- 
dures. To analyze which aspects of budgetary procedures are the most impor- 
tant ones, we follow an approach similar to Alesina et al. (1996), using infor- 
mation provided by von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1996) and 
distinguishing between the following aspects of the budgetary process (in pa- 
rentheses the corresponding items of von Hagen are shown): 
Al. Position of minister of finance (items Ib, Id, 4a, 4c)* 
A2.  Position of legislature (items 2a-e)3 
A3.  Presence of some kind of constraints (items la, 5d)" 
A4.  Transparency of the budget (items 3a~)~ 
A5.  Flexibility during execution of the budget (items 4b, d, e, f)" 
A6.  Relationship with other parts of government 
It has been argued by various authors that a minister of finance (MF)-in 
contrast to spending ministers-does  not strive for a large budget but is more 
constrained by considerations of general welfare. Consequently, a strong posi- 
tion of the MF-both  in the preparatory and execution phase of the budget- 
may enhance budget discipline.'  The position of  the legislature may  also be 
important. It is generally assumed that if parliament has much power to change 
the proposed budget, it is likely that budget deficits will be higher than pro- 
posed by the government. The presence of various kinds of binding constraints 
(varying from constraints in the constitution or the law to political agreements) 
may foster budget discipline. The transparency of the budget may also be im- 
2. These items refer to the position of the minister of finance (MF) in agenda setting, the struc- 
ture of the negotiations, whether MF can block expenditures during execution phase, and whether 
disbursements require approval of ME 
3. These items refer to room for amendments, whether they have to be offsetting, whether they 
can cause the fall of government, whether all expenditures are passed in one vote, and whether 
there is a global vote on total budget size. 
4. These items refer to presence of general constraints and the degree of political commitment 
to a long-term planning constraint. 
5. These items refer to whether special funds are included, whether budget is submitted in one 
document, assessment of  transparency by  respondents, link to national accounts, and whether 
loans to nongovernment entities are included. 
6. These items refer to presence of cash limits, transfers between chapters, changes in budget 
law during execution, carryover of unused funds to the next year. We have corrected the codings 
of item 4f of von Hagen 1992 in our research, as they do not correspond to the possible scorings 
in the explanation of the contents of the table on p. 72 of von Hagen 1992. A score on item 4f of 
1 should be 1.33,2 should be 2.66 and 3 should be 4. 
7. Von Hagen distinguishes between both phases of the budgetary process, but here we follow 
Alesina et al. (1996), who also focus on the position on the MF in the entire budget process. 269  Budgetary Procedures-Aspects  and Changes 
portant: the more transparent the budget, the more difficult it will be to use 
budgetary tricks to increase expenditures. As Alesina and Perotti (chap. 1 in 
this volume) put it: “at least up to a point, the less the electorate knows and 
understands about the budget process, the more the politicians can act strategi- 
cally and use fiscal deficits and overspending to achieve opportunistic goals.” 
A fifth item is the execution of the budget. How binding the budget law is for 
government depends, inter alia, on the possibility of proposing supplementary 
budgets and the relative importance of open-ended appropriations in the bud- 
get. The final issue that we distinguish is the relationship between central gov- 
ernment and other levels of government. Although von Hagen (1992) provides 
some information on this issue, he does not take it into account in constructing 
his budget indicators. Still, this issue may  be important since the degree of 
fiscal decentralization is often found to influence fiscal policy outcomes. One 
reason may be that local governments generally face a harder budget constraint 
than  the  federal or  national government (Moessen  and Van  Cauwenberge 
1997). Our sixth variable is the score on two items: whether other levels of 
government face some kind of balanced-budget requirement, and the degree 
of planning autonomy of  regional authorities8 All variables that we use are 
normalized on a scale ranging between 0 and 4.9  The variable A,, is the sum 
of variables A 1 to A6. 
To  analyze whether an aspect of budgetary procedures has changed since 
the beginning of the 1990s in the four countries that we focus on, we have sent 
out a survey with questions on the aspects outlined above. The survey is added 
as appendix A. The survey was sent to the ministry of  finance or, in case we 
did not get a response, to experts at the national central bank. The answers 
were subsequently checked by  experts from outside government. In case of 
diverging answers we went back to the original respondents to clear these is- 
sues. By  following this procedure, we are quite certain that our surveys give 
an adequate representation of  the current budgetary process in Belgium, Ire- 
land, Italy, and Sweden. 
This approach may yield insights with respect to changes in the budgetary 
process. Indeed, in the case of Sweden we can clearly identify which aspects 
of the budgetary process have changed recently. Although it may be necessary 
to discover what-if  anything-has  changed in the budgetary process, simply 
conducting another survey is not without problems. First, the questions that we 
have asked were not exactly the same questions as von Hagen posed. From a 
much wider set of questions he included those items where the answers varied 
8. The information is taken from table A1  in von Hagen  1992. If local governments have no 
planning autonomy, the second variable is 4; if they have limited autonomy, it is 2.66;  if they may 
be placed under surveillance, it is 1.33, and in case of autonomy it is 0. The first variable measures 
whether a binding balanced-budget constraint exists: 4 for a binding requirement; 2.66 for the 
golden rule; 1.33 for not binding; and 0 if there is no requirement. 
9. The total score is divided by  the number of issues taken into account to construct the vari- 
able concerned. 270  Jakob de Haan, Wim Moessen, and Bj~rn  Volkerink 
the most across countries. Still, the purpose of our survey is to analyze whether 
changes in the selected items have occurred, and for that purpose our approach 
is valid. 
Second, the person who answered our questions is in most cases not the 
same as von Hagen’s respondent, and this may yield different answers due to 
the subjective nature of at least some of the questions. The only exception here 
is Sweden, where the budget process was evaluated in 1992 on the basis of 
items as published in von Hagen 1992; after a number of reforms the process 
was evaluated again (Swedish Ministry of Finance 1995). As the issues raised 
were exactly the same in both evaluations, the first potential problem also is 
unlikely to have affected the outcomes for Sweden. 
Third, the overall attitude with respect to the importance of sound budgetary 
procedures-and,  more generally, sound fiscal policies-may  have changed 
since von  Hagen  conducted  his survey, and this may  affect our survey. Al- 
though the purpose of our survey is to find out whether any changes have oc- 
curred in those aspects of the budgetary process that we have distinguished in 
the four countries that we focus on, we have sent out the questionnaire to all 
EU countries,I0 as this allows us to discover whether any systematic pattern is 
present.  If, for example, the overall score in all countries  were higher, this 
could indicate that increased awareness may have affected our results. Table 
11.1 shows the total scores (the sum of A 1 to A6)  based on the results as re- 
ported by von Hagen (1992) and the results of our survey. It follows that indeed 
in all countries included in von Hagen’s  (1992) study and in our survey the 
scores in our survey are higher. Still, the most remarkable increases occur in 
the budgetary procedures of  the countries that we analyze in more detail in 
section 11.4. 
Apart from the factors pointed out above, there are two other possible expla- 
nations for any differences between the results of our survey and that of von 
Hagen. First, interpretations of existing rules in the budget process may have 
become stricter. We would definitely consider this a change in budgetary insti- 
tutions, similar to a change in the formal rules. Second, the coding as reported 
in von Hagen 1992 may have suffered from incomplete information. It is sim- 
ply impossible for any researcher in comparative analysis to check for all coun- 
tries whether the answers given are accurate. For those countries that an author 
is most familiar with, this an easier task. Indeed, for the case of the Nether- 
lands, for example, we have some doubts about certain codings given by von 
Hagen. For instance, for item  lb (presence of some general constraint) the 
score of von Hagen indicates that the level of government debt acted as some 
kind of constraint in Dutch budgetary procedures.  However, at the beginning 
of the 1990s the norms of fiscal policy in the Netherlands related to the budget 
deficit and the level of taxes and social security payments as share of national 
10. Including the new EU member states (Austria, Finland, and Sweden), as this may provide 
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Table 11.1  Indicators of Budgetary Institutions Based on von Hagen and 
New Survey 








































Note: The table presents the scores of A,,, as constructed on the basis of information provided in 
von Hagen 1992 and von Hagen and Harden 1996 and on the basis of  a new survey. 
"As  of  1999, score is 15.50. 
income (see de Haan, Sterks, and de Kam 1992), which is not one of the op- 
tions given by von Hagen. This brings us to another issue. Sometimes our re- 
spondents indicated that the possible answers-which  were all taken from von 
Hagen (1992) for comparison purposes-were  not sufficient."  For instance, 
in Ireland parliament has no ability to amend government "estimates"-only 
to accept or reject them (see appendix B for details). In those cases we took 
the score for the answer that was closest to the answer actually given. 
After this discussion of our methodology we now turn to our results concern- 
ing the importance of the distinguished aspects of budgetary institutions. 
11.3  Aspects of Budgetary Institutions 
Table  11.2 presents a summary of the variables we distinguished in the pre- 
vious section. The variables are based only on the information provided by von 
Hagen (1992) (and von Hagen and Harden 1996 for Luxembourg). The data 
relate to the situation at the beginning of the 1990s.  The variable A,,  is the sum 
of all variables (Al-A6).  It is quite remarkable that the scores for the various 
aspects of the budgetary process show considerable variation across countries. 
Table 11.3 shows a simple correlation matrix of the data presented in table 
11.2. The variable d(debt) is the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio over the pe- 
11. We included a question concerning the adequacy of the options given for all clusters of 
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Table 11.2  Aspects of Budgetary Institutions at the Beginning of the 1990s 
Variable 













1.25  0.80 
1.75  2.40 
4.00  3.60 
1.25  0.00 
0.25  1.60 
0.75  1.20 
2.50  2.00 
2.75  3.20 
2.50  0.25 
0.50  0.80 
1.75  3.20 
3.25  0.80 
0.00  2.00 
3.00  2.67 
2.50  3.66 
3.00  3.40 
1.00  2.07 
2.50  1.00 
2.50  1.00 
1.50  3.73 
2.50  3.60 
1.50  1.47 
0.50  3.00 
3.50  3.20 
1.80  1.33  7.18 
2.60  2.67  15.08 
3.13  3.33  20.23 
2.82  2.00  15.26 
2.90  2.67  9.88 
3.00  0.00  8.35 
0.25  1.33  7.03 
2.67  0.67  13.06 
0.33  2.00  14.38 
2.67  0.00  8.38 
1.53  0.00  6.33 
2.93  2.66  17.24 
Source: own calculations based on information provided by von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and 
Harden (1996). 
Note: The possible score of all aspects as distinguished in section  1 I .2 (A  1-A6)  ranges between 
0 and 4. A,", is the sum of AlLA6. Differences are possible due to rounding. 
Table 11.3  Correlation Matrix 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A,<>, 
A2  0.43 
A3  0.33  0.61 
A4  0.67  0.56  0.19 
A5  0.25  -0.00  0.14  0.13 
A,m  0.77  0.77  0.67  0.73  0.39  0.76 
&debt)  -0.50  -0.54  -0.45  -0.58  -0.36  0.05  -0.57 
A6  0.49  0.5 1  0.45  0.44  0.18 
riod 1980-92.  It follows that the correlation between the various aspects of the 
budgetary process that we have distinguished is sometimes quite low. It is, for 
instance, quite remarkable that the presence of some binding constraint (A3) is 
hardly related to the flexibility in the execution process (A5). The correlation 
between the position of the legislature (A2) and A5 is even less. It also follows 
that the total index and the transparency  of the budget (A4) show the highest 
correlation with the change in the general government debt-to-GDP ratio over 
the period under consideration. 
The remainder of this section reports the outcomes of a model similar to the 
one used by Roubini and Sachs (1989b) to analyze which aspects of budgetary 
institutions affect fiscal policy outcomes most strongly. As Roubini and Sachs 
have pointed  out, the specification of this model is consistent both with ele- 
ments of optimizing approaches to budget deficits (such as the tax-smoothing 
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Indeed, both theories imply that budget deficits are countercyclical. Variants 
of this model have also been used in subsequent research (de Haan and Sturm 
1994; Hallerberg and von Hagen, chap. 9 in this volume). The model is esti- 
mated using panel data for 12 EU member countries over the period 1980-92. 
Suppressing time indices, the estimated equation is 
(1)  DBY  =  a,+  a,DBYL +  a,DU  +  u,GR  +  u,DRB  +  a,A  +  v, 
where the dependent variable (DBY) denotes the change in the public-debt-to- 
GDP ratio. The explanatory variables are the lagged change in the debt ratio 
(DBYL), the change in the unemployment rate (DU), the GDP growth rate 
(GR), the change in debt-servicing costs (DRB),',  and some indicator for the 
budgetary process (A); v denotes the error term. 
The results using A,",  as an indicator for the strength of budgetary procedures 
are for the coefficients of a,, to a5,  respectively (t-statistics are shown in paren- 
theses): .03 (3.47), .32 (4.89), .43 (lSl), -.46  (-2.89),  2.65  (6.46),  and 
-.001  (-1.82).  The indicator is significant at the  10 percent level, but the 
coefficient is not very large. All other variables (except the coefficient on the 
change in unemployment rate) are significant at the 5 percent level. These 
findings are in line with the results reported in de Haan and Sturm (1994). 
Budgetary institutions matter, but the effect on fiscal outcomes is quite small. 
Next, we have examined whether all aspects of the budgetary process as we 
have distinguished them in section 11.2 are equally important. The first step is 
to calculate the F-statistic for the test that all coefficients are the same if all 
indicators are included in the regression for gross government debt growth. 
This statistic is .57, which implies that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Next, 
we have repeated the regression, each time subtracting one of the aspects that 
we have distinguished fromA,o,.'3  If the results are different in comparison with 
the regression reported above, this would be an indication of the importance of 
the excluded aspect of  the budgetary process. The results are shown in the 
upper part of table 11.4. As the coefficients of the other included variables are 
similar to those reported above, we only report the coefficients for the budget- 
ary variables. It follows that the coefficients and their significance levels are 
very similar, suggesting that all aspects of the budgetary process that we have 
distinguished are more or less equally important. Similar results are found if 
we use the various budgetary indicators (Al-A6)  as explanatory variables in 
equation (1) instead of A,,,  (not shown). However, it is possible that differences 
12. We have used two variants for this variable. First, actual interest payments as share of GDP. 
Second, a similar variable as used by Roubini and Sachs, namely: d(i -  p -  n)BY,-,, where i 
denotes interest payments on government debt divided by government debt, p is the rate of  infla- 
tion, and n is the GDP growth rate. Whenever the real interest rate exceeds the rate of  real output 
growth-as  was the case in many countries during the  1980s-the  outstanding debt imposes a 
burden on the public finances. If this rising debt burden is transitory, it should be accommodated 
by a temporary rise in the budget deficit, as argued by Roubini and Sachs. Both variables yielded 
similar results. The results shown are those using actual interest payments. All data are from the 
OECD and the European Commission. 
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Table 11.4  Estimates of Equation (1) (budgetary variables only), 12 EU Member 
Countries, 1980-92 
Variable 
Coefficient  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
(t-statistic)  (- 1.72)*  (- 1.81)*  (- 1.72)*  (- 1.76)*  (- 1.59)  (-2.10)** 
Variable 
A1  A2  A3  A4  AS  A6 
Budgetary  -0.003  0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.003 
variable  (-0.99)  (0.58)  (0.27)  (-0.42)  (0.02)  (1.14) 
Interaction  -0.001  -0.187  -0.174  -0.081  -0.163  -0.136 
variable  (-0.01)  (-2.38)**  (-2.57)**  (-1.37)  (-2.78)**  (-1.48) 
Note: The upper part of the table presents estimates of a, in equation (1) with various budgetary indicators. 
These consist of the scores of A,o, minus the scores of  the various aspects of budgetary procedures as 
distinguished in section 11.2 (A1 to A6). The lower part of the table presents estimates of  equation (1) in 
which A1  to A6  are used as budgetary indicators. The interaction variable consists of  the interaction of 
GDP growth and the budgetary indicators. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
in budgetary institutions are more strongly felt during economic downturns. 
We have therefore reestimated the model, adding each time an interaction vari- 
able that consists of the product of the GDP growth rate and the budgetary 
institution  variable. Multicollinearity  problems forced us  not to include the 
GDP growth rate as a separate variable. The coefficients of the interaction vari- 
ables are shown in lower part of  table 11.4. The results suggest that the position 
of  the legislature, the presence of  binding constraints, and flexibility during 
the execution of the budget matter most. Our findings are not entirely in line 
with those of Alesina et al. (1996), who found that the position of the minister 
of  finance and the transparency of the budget showed the lowest correlation 
with budgetary outcomes in their sample of Latin American countries. They 
argue, however, that this is probably due to the difficulty of measuring these 
aspects in their sample. 
11.4  Evolution of Budgetary Institutions: 
Evidence for Some European Countries 
11.4.1  Introduction 
Figure 11.1 shows the public-gross-debt-to-GDP ratio in Belgium, Ireland, 
Italy, and Sweden over the period  1979-95.  It follows that the debt ratio in 
these countries has developed quite differently over the period under consider- 
ation. In Ireland the upward trend has been reversed. In contrast, in Italy the 
debt ratio was on the rise until 1994; since then some stabilization has set in. 
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Table 11.5  Changes in Codings of Aspects of Budgetary Procedures 
Aspect 
Belgium  Ireland  Italy  Sweden 
Old  New  Old  New  Old  New  Old  New 
Position of minister of 
finance (A 1)  1.25  3.25  0.25  3.25  0.75  0.75  1.00  1.75 
Position of legislature 
(A21  0.80  1.60  1.60  3.00  1.20  2.80  1.60  3.20 
Constraints (A3)  0.00  3.00  2.50  3.00  2.50  2.50  0.50  4.00 
Transparency (A4)  2.00  3.13  1.00  1.53  1.00  0.80  1.00  3.20 
Flexibility during 
execution (A5)  1.80  2.92  3.00  2.67  0.25  1.58  1.68  2.02 
Relationship with 
other parts of 
government (A6)  1.33  1.33  0.00  3.33  1.33  2.66  0.00  1.3Y 
Total  7.18  15.23  8.35  16.78  7.03  11.09  5.78  15.50" 
"From 1999 onward. 
the debt ratio is still very high. In Sweden the debt ratio increased until 1994, 
but has been stabilized since. 
In this section we analyze whether budgetary procedures in the four coun- 
tries under consideration have changed recently, and if so, why these changes 
occurred and what their consequences were in terms of policy outcomes. An 
important input in this process are the results of our survey. Appendix B con- 
tains the detailed results of our survey. Table 11.5 summarizes our main find- 276  Jakob de Haan, Wim Moessen, and Bj~rn  Volkerink 
ings as reported in appendix B. The table presents the situation at the beginning 
of the 1990s, mostly based on von Hagen 1992 and the outcomes of our survey. 
There are  notable  differences. As  described  in  section  11.2, however,  the 
simple fact that we find other scores for our budgetary variables may not neces- 
sarily be caused by actual changes in budgetary institutions (except probably 
for Sweden). Therefore, the information from our survey is supplemented by 
information from various other sources to enable us to evaluate developments 
in  the budgetary  process in  the  countries  under  consideration. We  start all 
country studies with an outline of the budget cycle. 
11.4.2  Belgium 
In 1989 a major institutional change occurred in Belgium as a new budget- 
ary law  (June 28,  1989) was enacted,  modifying  substantially the previous 
budgetary law of  1963. Two concerns were explicitly articulated: (i) the pre- 
sentation of the budget in terms of programs, and (ii) a stricter timing for the 
parliamentary approval of the submitted budget. In addition some minor modi- 
fications were implemented. 
Before  1989 the principle of  “speciality” was interpreted rather rigorously 
in the sense that the Belgian budget easily encompassed some 2,400 line items. 
As usual, these line items were input oriented (e.g., wages, operating costs), 
and quite often they represented minuscule amounts of money. This required a 
drastic reduction in the number of budget items. At present the budget covers 
some 500 items that focus on programs.  For each program the total cost is 
stated together with a program description and a tentatively quantified program 
output. The further breakdown of the program appropriation into the detailed 
cost elements is also communicated to the parliament, but no longer requires 
a formal vote. Moreover, within the same program (and below  some precise 
legal ceilings) the spending minister is entitled to reshuffle the cost items dur- 
ing the execution of the budget. This modification significantly increases the 
managerial  autonomy  of the  spending minister  within  the  approved budget 
program and the prespecified rules. 
The tardy vote of the budget constituted another major drawback of the pre- 
vious budgetary procedure. Although the budgetary documents were to be sub- 
mitted before the end of September, the parliament rarely succeeded in approv- 
ing  the  budget  before  the  end  of  December.  Quite  often  one had  to have 
recourse to the escape route of  “provisional  twelfths.” This means that each 
month a routine paragraph is approved that allows each spending minister to 
operate as a going concern, limiting the outlays to one-twelfth of the last bud- 
get law. No new activities may be undertaken. This procedure was repeated 
for several months in a row, quite often until March. The new law drives the 
formal vote forward to the end of November instead of  December (see table 
11.6). 
When interpreting the codings in appendix B one should also keep in mind 
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Table 11.6  Budgetary Cycle in Belgium 










January  1 
FY  t 
Source: OECD (1995). 
Minister of the budget and minister of finance send their colleagues 
a circular setting out guidelines for drawing up budget proposals 
for the following fiscal year. The instructions have already been 
approved by the Council of Ministers. 
On the basis of the guidelines in the budget circular, all the ministers 
draw up, with the help of their officials, a budget estimate for their 
department, based on unchanged policies. The appropriations 
required for any new initiatives must figure separately in the 
budget estimate. The proposals are sent for his or her advice to the 
inspector of finance accredited to the department. 
The budget estimates are then reviewed in bilateral meetings 
(between each spending department and the Budget Department). 
When all departmental budget estimates have been bilaterally 
reviewed, the minister of the budget presents a report on the 
outcome to the Council of Ministers at the end of June. The 
minister of finance does the same for the Ways and Means budget 
estimate. 
ministerial Select Committee headed by  the prime minister. 
Committee, they are submitted to the Council of  Ministers for 
decision in late July-early August. 
Early July marks the beginning of a series of meetings held by the 
Once the budget proposals have been reviewed by the Select 
Submission to parliament. 
Formal vote in parliament. 
Start of fiscal year t. 
there was a constitutional reform in 1988-89  that transformed Belgium from 
a unitary to a federal state. In one stroke about one-third of  the central govern- 
ment spending was transferred to the regional level. This expenditure shift is 
highly concentrated on the areas of education, cultural and recreational affairs, 
public health and welfare services to individuals, transportation, environment, 
and economic matters. Shared taxes constitute the major financing source for 
the regional level. More than 90 percent of the tax proceeds originate from a 
joint personal income tax and VAT. Exclusive taxes are deliberately downsized 
to a limited scope (such as the inheritance tax, the tax on games and bets) in 
order to minimize local distortions or an overexploitation of  the tax bases. At 
the same time, it is believed that fiscal federalism can exert some disciplinary 
force. The golden rule applies de facto for the regional level, which has limited 
access to public borrowing and no opportunity for seignorage collection. As 
opposed to the central government, the regional level is confronted with  a 
harder budget constraint. In a federalist setting more government decisions are 
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Second, the prescriptions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) have also reshaped 
budgetary attitudes. Belgium has committed itself to a first entrance into the 
EMU. The ambition to reduce the general government budget deficit from 7.2 
percent of GDP to 3 percent in five years requires a sustained austerity, which 
in turn places fiscal discipline high on the political agenda and also emphasizes 
the relative weight of  the minister of finance. 
Comparing the old and the new scores of the various indicators that we have 
distinguished (table 1 1.3, it follows that the most notable differences for Bel- 
gium occur with respect to the position  of the MF (Al) and the presence of 
constraints (A3). As the Maastricht fiscal targets became more important, the 
position of the minister of the budget together with the MF became stronger. 
For instance, in  1992 the minister of the budget got the title of vice prime 
minister. Still, part of the differences in comparison with the codings of von 
Hagen may be due to different evaluations of budgetary practices. For instance, 
according to von Hagen the MF cannot block expenditures. Strictly speaking 
this  is correct. However, the minister of the budget can block expenditures 
upon instigation of the accredited inspector of finance. As the MF teams with 
the minister of  the budget,  we agree with our respondent that the maximum 
score is therefore more appropriate (see appendix B for further details). 
As explained above, from 1992 on the guidelines of Maastricht have ori- 
ented, some would say dictated, fiscal policy in Belgium, which is devoted to 
a first entrance into EMU. Each year, a numerical time-path is specified for the 
next year and the following years until the start-up of the EMU. This results in 
a strong political commitment  to the  deficit and debt targets, in contrast to 
the past. 
The score onA4 (transparency) is also higher in our survey. Here at least part 
of  the differences with respect to the results of von Hagen is due to subjective 
interpretations. For instance, although the budget consists of one document 
(unity  of  budget presentation), it materializes in three “books” to make the 
volumes manageable. This has been the practice for some time now. Our re- 
spondent  therefore  answered  that  the document  consists of  one document, 
while  the  score of  von  Hagen  implied that this  was only  the case recently. 
Another major difference under this heading is the link to the National Ac- 
counts, which-in  contrast to von Hagen’s information-is  provided, albeit in 
a different document; this practice has not changed recently. 
11.4.3  Ireland 
As follows from the outline of the budgetary cycle shown in table 1  I .7 the 
MF takes the lead in the budgetary process  in Ireland. In recent  years, the 
practice has been to specify medium-term fiscal objectives. Since 1980 there 
has been broad political consensus that restoration of fiscal balance is essential 
for promoting economic growth. To this end, various specific quantitative tar- 
gets have been used. Recent practice has been to specify specific medium-term 
fiscal objectives, particularly in relation to the deficit and public debt ratios, as 279  Budgetary Procedures-Aspects  and Changes 
Table 11.7  Budgetary Cycle in Ireland 
Main Events and Activities 














MF issues circular requesting departments to submit expenditure 
After departments have submitted their three-year NPC projections, 
Taking NPC projections into account, government decides on 
MF issues circular to spending departments, which inter alia 
projections on no-policy-change (NPC) scenario. 
negotiations take place between DF and departments. 
targets for budgetary aggregates like general government deficit. 
explain the parameters with which the budget will operate and 
which seek appropriate adjustments to existing spending plans. 
examination. Subsequently, MF briefs government on remaining 
areas of dispute. Government decides on detailed expenditure 
allocations. 
Abridged version of “Estimates for Public Services” is published. 
MF  formulates proposals for annual budget statement that is 
presented to Diil toward end of January. White Paper on 
Receipts and Expenditures is published. 
Departments submit draft expenditure estimates to DF for 
Revised estimates are published, together with public capital 
Enactment of Finance Bill. This gives legislative effect to the tax 
Diil votes on individual spending estimates by way of financial 
If necessary, supplementary estimates are submitted for approval by 
Appropriation Bill is passed. 
program. 
changes proposed in the budget statement. 
resolutions. 
the Diil. 
Source: Public Financial Procedures, June 1996. 
Note: With effect from budget year 1998, the budget date will be brought forward from January 
to October, which will mean presenting the 1998 budget in late October 1997. 
Ireland is clearly committed to becoming a member of EMU. Indeed in the 
policy agreement A  Government of Renewal  between Fine Gael, the Labor 
Party, and Democratic Left of December 1994, it was stated, “This Govem- 
ment is committed to a firm management of the public finances throughout its 
period in office. In particular, we accept the public debt philosophy and targets 
set out in the Maastricht Treaty . . . to adhere strictly to an  annual General 
Government Deficit of no more than 3% of GDP . . . and to reduce the Debt/ 
GDP ratio towards 60%.” 
The annual Estimates Circular seeks expenditure demands that comply with 
these medium-term objectives. Spending departments, in submitting their an- 
nual demands for resources, must now provide details of forecast resource re- 
quirements for three years ahead. Their demands are then assessed for consis- 
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clarifies the basis for the bids and focuses on the elimination of excess demand. 
Despite that process, the aggregate demand typically exceeds the allocation for 
departmental spending that would be consistent with the target for the overall 
deficit. The next stage is, therefore, for the MF to undertake a series of bilateral 
meetings with each of his or her colleagues to establish priorities for the allo- 
cation of the available resources. The Department of Finance (DF) again aggre- 
gates the outcome of these negotiations into a total provision for all departmen- 
tal spending and presents it to government in an overall budget context. If the 
outlook remains unsatisfactory, the government will instigate a further round 
of bilateral meetings to secure further reductions. Finalization of the budget 
also requires cabinet decisions on specific taxation changes and final adjust- 
ments to spending plans. 
Recently, the budgetary process was strengthened, as in the 1996 budget a 
full system of multiannual budgeting was announced. This approach involves 
three-year benchmark projections for the budgetary aggregates. In setting the 
budget targets and making budget decisions in year n, the impact of those deci- 
sions on the budget positions for years n + 1 and n + 2 is considered. In year 
n the budget projections for years n + 1 and n + 2 on the basis of continuation 
of policies as pursued in year n are published. So, the 1997 budget contained 
projections  for the main economic and budgetary  aggregates for 1998 and 
1999, as well 1997. In making these projections, it was also considered prudent 
to include a contingency provision for unforeseen factors that could have an 
impact on the budgetary aggregates in the medium term. 
In 1996 cash-limited spending programs were introduced after a joint report 
by  the  Department  of  Finance/Comptroller  and  auditor  general.  "Cash- 
limited" means that entitlement to payment in a specific year will be contingent 
on the availability of funds. 
Comparing the old and the new scores of the various indicators that we have 
distinguished (table 11.5) it follows that the most notable differences for Ire- 
land occur with respect to the position of  the MF (Al) and the relationship 
with local governments (A6). Our respondent did not indicate that the formal 
rules concerning the position of the MF  have changed. The most notable differ- 
ences with respect to the codings of von  Hagen relate to the position of the 
MF in the execution phase, as our respondent indicated that the MF can block 
expenditures and that his or her approval is required for disbursement. Indeed, 
the expenses of government departments are paid out of moneys provided by 
the Oireachtas (Irish parliament) to such an amount as sanctioned by the MF 
under section 2(4) of the Minister and Secretaries Act, 1924, and confirmed by 
section 3(3) of the Controller and Auditor General Act, 1993. The difference 
with respect to the codings of von Hagen may therefore reflect the formal rule 
versus actual practice. 
A new system of financing local government has been introduced with effect 
from budget year 1997. The new system involves the abolition of charges of 
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replaced by  the assignment of  motor tax revenue currently paid directly to 
central government. In general, local governments have limited autonomy and 
face, according to our information, a balanced-budget requirement. 
11.4.4  Italy 
The main features of the budgetary process in Italy are shown in table 11.8. 
The process is extremely complicated. At the budget formulation stage, three 
ministries-the  Treasury, budget, and finance-are  involved. The central role 
in budgetary matters is played by a department within the Treasury, Ragioneria 
Generale dello Stato (RGS). The responsibility for economic and fiscal poli- 
cymaking is shared between the Ministry of Finance and the Economic Plan- 
ning Ministry: the first has the lead in fiscal revenue policies (taxes and other 
revenues), the second in macroeconomic forecasting (OECD 1995). The pro- 
cess generates several budget documents, which differ in terms of accounting 
basis, sectoral coverage, and date of issuance. In May the Documento di Pro- 
grammazione Economica e Finanziaria (DPEF) is presented, which contains 
two sets of  projections for the next three years: trend projections based on 
existing legislation and a program projection. The DPEF has a heavy emphasis 
on planning, and often fails to keep a clear distinction between trends and plans 
(Alesina et al. 1995). The DPEF quantifies deficit targets, but does not specify 
measures to reach them (OECD  1997). In  July budgetary projections under 
current legislation (bilancio a legislazione vigente), which refer to the state 
only, are presented to parliament. 
At the beginning of  1997 a budget reform was approved that has led to some 
changes. The main change is that the parliament is no longer going to approve 
a budget in which expenditure is organized in about six thousand items, and 
will deal with a simplified structure. The budget is going to be organized ac- 
cording to “functional targets” (that indicate the main political decisions), and 
according to “base units” (that indicate resources for the responsibility centers 
of  the state administration). This reform may  increase transparency and ac- 
countability both at the political and at the administrative level. 
Comparing the old and the new scores of the various indicators that we have 
distinguished (table llS),  it follows that the most notable differences for Italy 
occur with respect to the position of  the legislature (A2) and the flexibility 
during execution of  the budget (A5). At  this stage it should be pointed out, 
however, that in the case of  Italy the answers of  our respondent and of  our 
outside expert sometimes differed considerably. On the basis of available evi- 
dence and subsequent answers to detailed further questions we have come up 
with the scores as shown in appendix B. In case of doubt from our side, we 
indicate so. 
11.4.5  Sweden 
Budgetary procedures have  improved considerably in Sweden (see below 
for further discussion; see also table 11.9). The acute financial crisis that hit Table 11.8  Budgetary Cycle in Italy 






Budget guidelines  Current and capital  Document of Economic  Parliament resolution  Annual and three-  Forecasting and planning 
prepared by RGS  account of  each  and Financial Planning  on DPEF  year budget on  report. Draft budget 
ministry submitted  (DPEF)  current legislation  documents submitted to 
to RGS  submitted to  parliament  by September 
parliament by 
July 31  by December 31) 
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public sector and the 
statement of cash 
accounts" 
Conclusion of  Treasury report on  General report on 
previous  cash outcomes for  the economic 
year's  budget  previous year  situation of the 
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Budget adjustment bill 
for the current year 
and financial 
statement for the 
previous year 
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parliament by June 30 
Source: OECD 1997. 
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Table 11.9  Budgetary Process in Sweden 











Directives from the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance 
Government discusses priorities 
Preparation of background material for government negotiations 
Spring Budget published, which contains three-year expenditure 
ceilings proposal, outline of the budget of next year, in-year 
followup report, and the outcome of the previous year 
to spending ministries for five-year expenditure forecast 
Parliamentary decision on Spring Budget 
Budget amendments presented to parliament (generally minor) 
Budget proposal presented to parliament 
First budget decision in parliament about the frames for 
Second budget decision in parliament about appropriation 
Issue letters to the agencies providing authorization for spending 
expenditures areas 
Source: Swedish Ministry of Finance. 
Sweden in the beginning of the 1990s was the main motivation of the reform 
of the budgetary process. In fact, reform of the budget process formed an inte- 
gral part of the policy of fiscal consolidation (OECD 1996). However, our sur- 
vey also revealed that recent academic work on budget institutions, notably the 
work of von Hagen as well as the personal commitment of high-ranking civil 
servants and the minister of finance-Goran  Persson, who became prime min- 
ister in March 1996-also  played a major role in the reform. 
In 1992 a parliamentary commission was installed to analyze possibilities 
for improving the budgetary process. In a report to the Ministry of  Finance 
(Molander 1992)  it was concluded that the Swedish budget process performed 
relatively poorly in comparison with other European countries with respect to 
expenditure control. This lack of control reflected a weak role of the minister 
of  finance, a fragmented budget process within parliament, absence of trans- 
parency and inadequate information content of the budget, and too much flex- 
ibility in the implementation of the budget (see also table 11 3.  The result was 
heavy spending overruns, primarily on transfer programs (OECD 1996). 
The aforementioned report of  Molander proposed to change the existing 
procedure, introducing the two-step procedure outlined in table 11.9. The final 
report of the parliamentary commission contained a further elaborated version 
of this two-step procedure. Implementation required a change of the constitu- 
tion. Both the old and the new parliament approved this change in 1994. 
A  second major  change was the introduction of  expenditure ceilings in 
1996, following a proposal from the government in  1995 (Molander 1997). 
The lack of control of government expenditure in the past was due to the fact 
that 70 percent of spending was governed by statutory rules, with no obligation 
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changes in order to bring expenditures in such programs back to a baseline 
(OECD 1996). Political opposition to expenditure ceilings motivated by fears 
that they would undermine security as provided by the welfare state has been 
voiced from the Left Party (formerly the Communist Party). The strong in- 
volvement of the new prime minister no doubt has helped to introduce the sys- 
tem of expenditure ceilings. Nowadays three-year ceilings are imposed for the 
27 major expenditure areas (including social security transfers, but excluding 
interest payments). These ceilings are the cornerstone of the new budget pro- 
cess. The total expenditure ceiling is derived ex ante from overall budgetary 
objectives and not from component commitments embodied in  the program 
setups (OECD 1996). The ceilings for the period 1997-99  were decided upon 
by parliament in the spring of 1996. The total expenditure ceiling was sched- 
uled to fall from 40.7 percent of GDP in 1997 to 37.5 percent in 1999 (OECD 
1996). The following budget rounds consist of decisions as to the expenditure 
ceiling for the new year, added to the three-year horizon. 
Comparing the old and the new scores of the various indicators that we have 
distinguished (table 11 S),  it follows that the indicators A4 (transparency of the 
budget) andA3 (constraints) show the highest increase. The budget is now, for 
example, submitted in one document (see appendix B for further details). The 
increase of A3 is due to the introduction of the expenditure ceilings outlined 
above and the strong political commitment attached to them. The most impor- 
tant change in the flexibility of the execution of the budget (A5) is also due to 
the system of expenditure ceilings. The increase in A2 (position of legislature) 
is due to the fact that the powers of parliament have been reduced somewhat. 
Amendments, for example, were not required to be offsetting previously, but 
they are now.  In the past there was only a final global vote, while the new 
procedure requires approval in the initial stage of the budgetary process (Swed- 
ish Ministry of Finance 1995). The position of the minister of finance (Al) has 
also improved slightly, as he or she now proposes budget norms on which the 
government will decide, whereas in the past a standard bottom-up procedure 
was applied (Swedish Ministry of Finance 1995). Finally, the position of local 
governments (A6) will change, as a binding requirement on their accounts to 
balance, combined with requirements to fund their commitments in the area of 
occupational pensions, will apply from the year 2000 (OECD 1996). 
11.5  Concluding Comments 
In this chapter we have analyzed which features of budget institutions are the 
most important in influencing fiscal policy outcomes using data for member 
countries of the European Union. It is concluded that budget institutions affect 
fiscal policy outcomes, but that the effect is quite small. There are some indica- 
tions that the position of the legislature, the presence of binding constraints, 
and flexibility during the execution of the budget matter most. We have also 
analyzed the evolution of budgetary institutions in some countries to examine 285  Budgetary Procedures-Aspects  and Changes 
the causes and impact of procedural changes. The countries included in the 
analysis have  divergent public-debt-to-GDP ratios. A survey under experts 
from these countries was  used, together with other information available, to 
analyze possible changes in budgetary institutions. The most notable changes 
occurred in Sweden. All aspects of the budgetary process that we have distin- 
guished improved, but the most notable changes relate to the transparency of 
the budget and the presence of  binding constraints. The latter is due to the 
introduction of  expenditure  ceilings  and  the  strong political commitment 
attached to them. The most important change in the flexibility of the execution 
of the budget is also due to this new system. The acute financial crisis that hit 
Sweden in the beginning of the 1990s was the main motivation of the reform 
of the budgetary process. However, our survey also revealed that recent aca- 
demic work on budget institutions as well as the personal commitment of high- 
ranking civil servants and the minister of finance also played a major role in 
the reform. Despite these improvements, the public debt ratio in Sweden has 
risen considerably since the beginning of the 1990s. It is our contention, how- 
ever, that without the improvement in the budgetary procedures the rise would 
probably have been even more pronounced. 
In Ireland the debt-to-GDP ratio rose in the 1980s, leading at that time to a 
broad political consensus that restoration of  fiscal balance was essential for 
promoting economic growth. To this end, various specific quantitative targets 
have been used. Recent practice has been to specify medium-term fiscal objec- 
tives, particularly in relation to the deficit and public debt ratios, as Ireland is 
clearly committed to becoming a member of EMU. The most notable differ- 
ences for Ireland in comparison with the survey of  von Hagen (1992) occur 
with respect to the position of  the minister of  finance, which are not due to 
changes in the formal procedures, but may reflect the formal rule versus ac- 
tual practice. 
In Belgium the Maastricht criteria have also strengthened the budgetary pro- 
cess since its latest reform in  1989. Belgium has committed itself to a first 
entrance into the EMU. The goal of reducing the general government budget 
deficit to  3 percent requires a sustained austerity, which in turn places fiscal 
discipline high on the political agenda and also emphasizes the relative weight 
of the minister of finance. It is our contention that the constitutional reform of 
1988-89,  which transformed Belgium from a unitary to a federal state, may 
exert some disciplinary force as well, since the golden rule applies de facto for 
regional governments, which have limited access to public borrowing and no 
opportunity of seignorage collection. 
Finally, in Italy the Maastricht criteria also have  some impact. Although 
there are no differences with respect to the von Hagen survey, our respondent 
has the impression that the policy constraints have become more rigid as a 
consequence of the EMU criteria. The most notable changes, in comparison to 
the results from von Hagen, regard the position of the legislature and flexibility 
during the execution phase of the budgetary cycle. 286  Jakob de Haan, Wim Moessen, and Bjern Volkerink 
Appendix A 
Survey 
I.  Questions relating to the position of the Minister of Finance (MF) 
1. Could you please indicate which one of the following is the best charac- 
terization  of  the agenda setting for the budget negotiating process in 
your country (choose only one): 
0  MF or cabinet collects bids from spending ministers; 
0  MF or cabinet collects bids subject to preagreed guidelines; 
0  cabinet decides on budget norms first; 
0  MF proposes budget norms to be voted on by cabinet: 
0  MF (or prime  minister) determines  budget parameters  to be ob- 
2.  Could you please indicate which one of the following is the best charac- 
terization  of the budget negotiating process in your country (choose 
only one): 
0  all cabinet members involved together 
0  multilateral 
0  bilateral between spending ministers and MF. 
served by spending ministers. 
3.  Can the MF block expenditures: yesho 
4.  Is disbursement approval required from MF (or controller): yesho 
It may be that the budgetary process in your country is not characterized 
adequately by the options outlined above; if so, please indicate in what re- 
spect the options are not adequate. 
Could you please indicate whether with respect to the questions 1-4  any- 
thing has changed since 199 1, and if so, why these changes occurred? 
11.  Questions relating to the position of the legislature 
5. Could you please indicate which one of the following is the best charac- 
terization of the position of the parliament: 
a. Possibility to propose amendments: unlimitednimited 
b.  Are these amendments required to be offsetting: yesho. 
c.  Can (accepted) amendments cause fall of government: yesho. 
d.  Are all expenditures passed in one vote: yedmixedvotes are chapter 
e. Is there a global vote on total budget size: final onlyhnitial. 
by chapter. 
It may be that the budgetary process in your country is not characterized 
adequately by the options outlined above; if so, please indicate in what re- 
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Could you please indicate whether with respect to question 5 anything has 
changed since 1991, and if  so, why these changes occurred? 
111. Questions relating to the presence of some kind of constraint 
6. Could you please indicate whether the government is bound by  some 
general constraint: 
0  none 
0  public-debt-to-GDP ratio 
0  public-debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit-to-GDP ratio 
0  government-spending-to-GDP ratio or Golden Rule 
0  government-spending-to-GDP ratio and deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
7. Could you please indicate which characterization is most adequate with 
respect to the degree of commitment of some long-term planning con- 
straint: 
0  no long-term planning constraint 
for internal orientation only 
0  indicative 
0  weak political commitment 
0  strong political commitment. 
It may be that the budgetary process in your country is not characterized 
adequately by the options outlined above; if so, please indicate in what re- 
spect the options are not adequate. 
Could you please indicate whether with respect to questions 6-7  anything 
has changed since 1991, and if so, why these changes occurred? 
IV.  Questions relating to the transparency of the budget 
8.  Could you please indicate which characterization is most adequate with 
respect to the transparency of the budget. 
a.  Are special funds included: notsometmosdyes, but annexed to bud- 
b.  Is the budget submitted in one document: notrecently yestyes. 
c.  Is the budget according to your personal view: hardly transparend 
d.  A link of  the budget to the national accounts is: not providedpos- 
e.  Government loans to non-government entities are included in budget 
It may be that the budgetary process in your country is not characterized 
adequately by the options outlined above; if so, please indicate in what re- 
spect the options are not adequate. 
Could you please indicate whether with respect to question 8 anything has 
changed since 1991, and if so, why these changes occurred? 
get drafityes. 
not fully transparenttfully transparent. 
sibletprovided in separate documentstdirect link provided. 
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V.  Questions relating to the flexibility during the execution of the budget 
9. Could you please indicate which characterization is most adequate with 
respect to the flexibility during the execution of the budget. 
a.  Are spending ministries subject to cash limits: no/yes. 
b.  Transfers of expenditure between chapters are: unrestrictedAimited 
require consent of MF/require consent of parliament/only within de- 
partments possible/only within departments and with consent of ME 
c. Changes in budget law  during execution are: at the discretion of 
governmenthy new law which is regularly submitted during fiscal 
year/at the discretion of MF/require consent of MF and parliament/ 
only by  new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations 
as the ordinary budget. 
d.  Carry-over of  unused funds to next year are: unrestrictednimited 
limited and requires authorization by MF or parliamenthot possible. 
It may be that the budgetary process in your country is not characterized 
adequately by the options outlined above; if so, please indicate in what re- 
spect the options are not adequate. 
Could you please indicate whether with respect to question 9 anything has 
changed since 1991, and if so, why these changes occurred? 
VI. Questions relating to the  relationship between  central government 
and other parts of government 
10. Could you  please indicate which characterization is most adequate 
with respect to the budgetary status of regional authorities: 
a.  balanced budget required: no/yes, but not considered to be binding/ 
Golden Rule requirernentlyes. 
b.  Planning  autonomy: lower-level  governments  are  autonomous/ 
they may be placed under surveillance of higher-level government/ 
they have limited autonomy/they have no autonomy. 
It may be that the budgetary process in your country is not characterized 
adequately by the options outlined above; if so, please indicate in what re- 
spect the options are not adequate. 
Could you please indicate whether with respect to question 10 anything 
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Appendix B 
Detailed Country Studies 
This appendix discusses our detailed results concerning the various aspects of 
budget institutions as distinguished in section 11.2. Any differences in coding 
between von Hagen 1992-or  in the case of Sweden, with respect to the situa- 
tion at the beginning of the 1990s-and  our survey are indicated in bold. 
Belgium 
Position of  the Minister of Finance (von Hagen Score Al: 1.25; Our Survey: 
3.25). The MF teams with the minister of the budget, who usually holds the 
title of vice prime minister. Even before the Maastricht fiscal targets came to 
play a major role in Belgian fiscal policy, one witnessed an increased “weight” 
of the minister of the budget together with the MF. In close cooperation with 
the prime minister they draft the “budget circular,” inviting the spending minis- 
ters to submit their budget proposals within specified parameters (item lb: 1). 
These instructions are to be approved by the Council of Ministers. In the ela- 
boration of their budget the spending ministers are advised by their higher-rank- 
ing civil servants and the inspector of finance who is accredited to the depart- 
ment. Starting from baseline projections, new activities and other priorities are 
incorporated in the budget proposals. These are submitted in a first round of 
scrutiny to the minister of the budget. Here they are bilaterally reviewed (item 
Id: 4 instead of 0). After aggregation they are confronted with the estimates of 
the MF for the Ways and Means. In fact there is a kind of division of labor in 
the sense that the MF handles the revenue side of  the budget (taxes, public 
debt), whereas the minister of the budget focuses on the expenditure side. Sev- 
eral rounds of bilateral “negotiations” may occur to target expenditures to reve- 
nues. Finally all items, which remain unresolved, are collected for a final de- 
cision  procedure  called  the  “Budgetary  Conclave.” Again  bilaterally  the 
spending ministers are now confronted with the “core” of the Council of Min- 
isters (i.e., prime minister, the vice prime ministers, and the MF). These deci- 
sions may  involve changes in tax laws, privatizations, or new debt manage- 
ment techniques. 
According to von Hagen the MF cannot block expenditures (item 4a: 0). In 
fact, it is the minister of the budget who can block expenditures upon instiga- 
tion of the accredited inspector of finance. A score of 4 may therefore be more 
appropriate. A preliminary “visum” of the department of the MF is required 
before cash disbursements are executed (item 4c: 4). 
Position of the Legislature (von  Hagen ScoreA2: 0.8;  Our Survey 1.60).  Policy 
outcomes are often compromises of the different parties constituting the coali- 
tion government. The parliament consists of a House of Representatives and a 
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in the budgetary procedure, which is the prerogative of the House of Represen- 
tatives. In principle the possibility  of proposing amendments is unlimited. In 
fact amendments are only marginal and, ironically enough, often address bud- 
get lines that are directed toward the operational costs of the House itself. This 
huge distance between principle and practice explains the difference with the 
score in the von Hagen paper (item 2a: 4 instead of 0). The amendments are 
not required to be offsetting (item 2b: 0) and do not cause the fall of a govern- 
ment (item 2c: 0 instead of 4). Usually it is the absence of consensus on funda- 
mental policy issues that causes the collapse of a coalition. Linguistic and ideo- 
logical  differences  between  Flanders  and Wallonia  have  often  reduced  the 
length of tenure of a government in the past. 
The proposed budget covers three documents: the expenditure budget, the 
budget of  ways and means, and the budget message (Algemene Toelichting). 
This latter document is more policy oriented and “readable” for the general 
public. It is not subject to a formal vote in the House of Representatives. The 
expenditure budget and the budget of ways and means have the format of  a 
budgetary law that is to be voted upon. 
As a rule the three documents are available before the end of  September, 
and votes take place before the end of November. The House has two months 
to assess and discuss the new budget. The more technical debates  are con- 
ducted in the specialized committees of the House, regrouping those represen- 
tatives with a special interest in, for example, foreign policy, social security, 
finance. The plenary debate, which requires several days in a row, is finalized 
by a vote chapter by chapter (item 2d: 4 instead of 0; item 2e: 0). 
Constraints (von  Hagen Score A3: 0.00; Our Survey 3.00). From 1992 on the 
guidelines of Maastricht have oriented, some would say “dictated,” the budget- 
ary behavior of Belgium, which is devoted to a first entrance into the EMU. 
When elaborating the budget each year, a numerical time path is specified for 
the next year and the following years until the start-up of the EMU. Remark- 
ably, a consensus is reached between  all the parties and interest groups in- 
volved. The scientific input for this deliberation is delivered by the High Coun- 
cil for Finance (which includes academia), the Economic Planning Agency, the 
National Bank, and the Department of Studies of the Ministry of Finance. This 
results in a strong political commitment to the 3 percent deficit-to-GNP ratio 
and to a “significant” reduction in the public-debt-to-GDP ratio (item  la: 0; 
now 2; item 5d: 0; now 4). 
Transparency of  the Budget (von Hagen Score A4: 2.00; Our Survey: 3.13). 
As already mentioned, the budget consists of one document (unity of budget 
presentation) that materializes in three “books” to make the volumes manage- 
able (item 3b: 4 instead of 2). Special funds are annexed to the budget draft 
(item 3a: 3 instead of 2).  The budget presentation is not fully transparent, as it 
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link to the national accounts is provided in a separate document called the 
“economic regrouping,” which is published some time later (item 3d: 0; now 
2.66). The “totality” requirement of the budget stipulates that loans to nongov- 
ernment entities should be included (item 3e: 4) 
Flexibility during Execution of  the Budget (von Hagen Score A5: 1.80; Our 
Survey: 2.92).  The von Hagen study reports that the spending ministers are not 
subject to cash limits. From our information it appears that the Treasury (Min- 
istry of Finance) severely surveys the cash flows (item 4b: 4 instead of 0). In 
fact, the austerity prescriptions of Maastricht have changed several aspects of 
the actual budgetary behavior. Nowadays a transfer of expenditures is restricted 
to line items within the same department and with the consent of the MF (item 
4d: 3.2; now 4). 
In  the early spring the government organizes a formal assessment of  the 
execution of the budget. The macroeconomic environment may have changed 
since the drafting of the budget in the summer of  the preceding year. There 
may be new information on real growth, inflation, interest rate levels, tax reve- 
nues, and unemployment. If  required, the expenditure and/or the revenue side 
of  the budget will be adjusted by  a formal law  to be voted by  the House of 
Representatives as an annex to the official budget law (item 4c: 4; now 1).  The 
carryover of unused funds to the next year is limited and requires the authoriza- 
tion of the MF and parliament. The rules are rather detailed and may differ for 
a recurrent expenditure versus an investment outlay (item 4f: 0; now 2.66). 
Relationship with Other Parts of Government (von Hagen Score A6: 1.33; Our 
Survey: 1.33). Since the constitutional reform of 1989-90 Belgium has become 
a federal state. Between the central and the local level (municipalities), the 
regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) have now required substantial compe- 
tence in areas such as economic development, environment, infrastructure, ed- 
ucation, and cultural affairs. Tax autonomy is restricted, but the regions benefit 
from a complex system of shared and assigned taxes (juste retour). The lower 
levels of government are primarily involved in allocation rather than redistribu- 
tion or stabilization. On average they face a harder budget constraint than the 
central government. The golden rule applies for the regions and the municipali- 
ties. However, within this constraint the own preferences are respected. 
Ireland 
Position of Minister of Finance (von  Hagen Score Al: 0.25; Our Survey: 3.25). 
As follows from the outline of the budgetary cycle, the MF takes the lead in 
the  budgetary process.  In  recent  years,  the  practice  has  been  to  specify 
medium-term fiscal objectives. In setting its targets for the 1997 budget, the 
government set specific targets for the deficit (and debt) and for overall tax/ 
expenditure aggregates for 1997-99,  taking account of  the foregoing projec- 
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with these medium-term objectives (item lb: 1). Spending departments, in sub- 
mitting their annual demands for resources, must provide details of  forecast 
resource requirements for three years ahead. Their demands are then assessed 
for consistency with the Estimates Circular specifications in a consultative pro- 
cess that clarifies the basis for the bids and focuses on the elimination of excess 
demand. Despite that process, the aggregate demand typically exceeds the allo- 
cation for departmental spending that would be consistent with the target for 
the overall deficit. The next stage is, therefore, for the MF to undertake a series 
of bilateral meetings with each of his or her colleagues to establish priorities 
for the allocation of the available resources. The Department of Finance again 
aggregates the outcome of these negotiations into a total provision for all de- 
partmental spending and presents it to government in an overall budget con- 
text. If the outlook remains unsatisfactory, the government will instigate a fur- 
ther round of bilateral meetings to secure further reductions (item Id: 4 instead 
of 0).  Finalization of  the budget  also requires cabinet decisions on specific 
taxation changes and final adjustments to spending plans. The MF can block 
expenditures during the execution phase of the budget (item 4a: 4 instead of 
0). The Public Financial Procedures (section A4) makes clear that expenditure 
must have authority of the Department of Finance. Disbursements also require 
approval (item 4c: 4 instead of 0). 
Position of Legislature  (von Hagen Score A2:  1.60; Our Survey: 3.00).  The 
legislature (Oireachtas) consists of  the president, who is head of  state under 
the constitution, the lower house (Dfiil Eireann) and the upper house (Seanad 
Eireann). Ministers must be members of a house of the Oireachtas. The prime 
minister, deputy prime minister, and MF must all be members of the Dfiil. Only 
the Dfiil has the power to amend legislation involving public monies; however, 
it is not empowered to amend estimates-only  to adopt or to reject them (item 
2a: 4). Standing orders (procedural rules) of the lower house preclude any addi- 
tion or reduction in the annual estimates. According to von  Hagen, amend- 
ments do not have to be offsetting (item 2b: 0), but one may question this score 
as parliament cannot amend estimates. (We have dropped this question in the 
calculation of our new score for A3.) However, the legislature can propose 
amendments to the taxation side of the budgetary equation, and in the past one 
government fell after one particular taxation proposal had been voted down by 
the Dfiil  (item 2c: 4). The upper house does not debate the budget per se; it 
does, however, consider the annual Finance Bill (taxation) and Appropriation 
Bill (expenditure), on which it may make recommendations that the Dfiil may 
either accept or reject. 
As follows from the outline of the budgetary  process,  the parliamentary 
stage in Ireland is prolonged into the financial year. Budget provisions are en- 
acted into law only after the budget  has already come into operation. This 
requires preliminary spending authorizations. This is provided for by  resolu- 
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shows the outturn for the previous financial year, estimated receipts and expen- 
ditures (both voted and nonvoted, see below), and the estimated borrowing re- 
quirement. The estimates are in highly aggregated form in this stage. The white 
paper is not the subject of  a D~l  motion. Individual estimates are updated, 
and each one is presented and debated on separately only in June/July. When 
an estimate is passed by the Dhil, it is technically known as a Vote. (The score 
for item 2d is zero according to von Hagen (1992), but given the procedures 
as outlined a score of 4 is more appropriate). Only in December is the Appro- 
priation Bill passed, which gives statutory effect to the estimates approved by 
the D6il (item 2e: 0). 
Government expenditure in Ireland falls into two broad categories: nonvoted 
expenditure, which the D&l does not have to vote on (like the service of  the 
national debt), and voted expenditures, which refers to the ordinary services 
of  departments (both capital and noncapital spending). Expenditure is pro- 
vided for under Votes, one or more covering the functions of each department 
or office (Public Financial Procedures, 1996). 
Constraints (von Hagen Score A3: 2.50; Our Survey: 3.00). Since 1980 there 
has been broad political consensus that restoration of fiscal balance is essential 
for promoting economic growth. To this end, various specific quantitative tar- 
gets have been used. As pointed out above, recent practice has been to specify 
medium-term fiscal objectives, particularly in relation to the deficit and public 
debt ratios (item la: 2).  Ireland's current fiscal policy is based on the mainte- 
nance of low budgetary deficits and is formally set out in the policy agreement, 
A  Government of  Renewal  (December 1994) between Fine Gael, the Labor 
Party and Democratic Left, and Partnership 2000 for Inclusion, Employment 
and Competitiveness, agreed with the social partners in December 1996. Now- 
adays, there is strong political commitment to the targets formulated (item 5d: 
4 instead of 3). 
Transparency of the Budget (von  Hagen Score A4: 1.00; Our Survey: 1.53).  As 
follows from the outline of the budgetary process, the budget does not consist 
of one document (item 3b: 0). Some special funds are included (item 3a: l), 
while our respondent to the survey regarded the budget as almost fully trans- 
parent (item 3c: 2). A link to the national accounts is provided in the budget 
booklet (item 3d: 2.66 instead of  0), while government loans are included in 
the finance accounts (item 3e: 2). 
Flexibility during Execution of the Budget (von Hagen Score A5: 3.00; Our 
Survey: 2.67). To ensure tight control of  expenditure and adequate notice of 
potential deviations from target, departments are required to submit a profile 
of expenditure by  month to the Department of Finance for approval at the be- 
ginning of  the year, and monthly returns of  actual and forecast expenditure 
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given month is less than the amount specified in the approved profile for that 
month, this will normally be regarded as a saving for the year; that is, it is not 
available for spending later in the year (item 4f 2.66 instead of 4). Approval 
for expenditure in a particular month in excess of the approved profile is only 
given where there is a clear-cut understanding that it will be offset by specific 
compensating measures later in the year. Only a small number of programs are 
cash limited (item 4b: 0). Transfers are normally only allowed within depart- 
ments and with consent of the MF (item 4d: 4). As follows from our description 
of  the budgetary process, changes in the budget law during execution require 
parliamentary approval (item 4e: 4). 
Relationship with Other Parts of Government (von Hagen Score A6: 0.00; Our 
Survey: 3.33). Ireland is a unitary state. There are two layers of government: 
central government, including the state-sponsored body sector, and regional 
government, which includes regional health boards and local authorities. There 
are also extrabudgetary funds (including social insurance funds). Local author- 
ities are responsible for such local services as provision of  public housing, 
construction and maintenance of  roads, water supplies and sanitary services, 
refuse collection, environmental protection, and fire services. Approximately 
half of their spending is funded by Exchequer grants, most of which are spe- 
cific grants, and the rest of their funding is raised at the local level. According 
to von Hagen local governments do not face certain constraints and are autono- 
mous with respect to budget planning. Our respondent answered, however, that 
they have limited autonomy. 
Italy 
Position of Minister of Finance (von Hagen Score Al:  0.75; Our Survey: 0.75). 
At the budget formulation stage, three ministries-the  Treasury, budget, and 
finance-are  involved. The central role in budgetary matters is played by  a 
department within the Treasury, Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS). The 
responsibility for economic and fiscal policymaking is shared between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Economic Planning Ministry: the first has the lead 
in fiscal revenue policies (taxes and other revenues), the second in macroeco- 
nomic forecasting (OECD 1995). The process generates several budget docu- 
ments, which differ in terms of  accounting basis, sectoral coverage, and date 
of issuance. Fiscal targets are set by  parliament on the basis of  a proposal by 
the three ministries (score lb: 1  .00).  This score is based on Alesina, Mare, and 
Perotti 1995. After that, negotiations take place between the spending depart- 
ments and notably the Treasury, which are, according to Alesina, Mare, and 
Perotti (1995), somewhat unregulated (item Id: 2). (However, according to our 
respondent a score of 4 [bilateral negotiations] would be more appropriate.) 
At the budget implementation stage, the Treasury has responsibility for the 
management of the state cash resources. The minister cannot block expendi- 
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quired is not entirely clear. According to our respondent it is required, but 
according to von Hagen and Harden (1994) and our outside expert it is not 
(item 4c: 0). 
Position of  Legislature (von Hagen Score A2: 1.20; Our Survey: 2.80).  Parlia- 
ment has two chambers: The Camera dei deputati (lower house) and the Senato 
della Republica (senate). In general, ministers are members of parliament. The 
budget documents are submitted by  the Government, either first to the lower 
house and subsequently to the senate, or vice versa. The two chambers have an 
equally important position regarding all sorts of  laws, including budgetary 
laws. When chambers disagree with each other, the law is examined again (and 
modified) following the same procedure. Since 1988, the Leggi di Bilancio 
(finance act) cannot be used to change substantive legislation as it can only 
reflect existing legislation (art. 81 of  the constitution). All interventions must 
be carried out in the Legge Finanziaria (LF) and Provvedimenti Collegati (PC). 
Once passed, these become existing legislation and are incorporated in the LB 
by  amending the LB with the Nota di Variazioni (Alesina, Mare, and Perotti 
1995; OECD 1995). 
The financial law, the connected laws, and the budget are examined by  the 
two houses in the same form. In each house these texts are examined before- 
hand by  parliamentary commissions, but at this stage the real voting process 
takes place only in the Budget Commission. This will pass the approved text 
to the full session. Here, the approbation of the financial law starts from article 
1, in which the maximum permitted for total budget size is set (item 2e: 4 
instead of 0). (Both our respondent and expert gave this score.) Still, as the 
DPEF sets only the aggregate objectives of the fiscal maneuver, and at an early 
stage of the budget process, it only provides a very vague description of  the 
government’s plan, without any realistic quantification of its expected savings. 
Thus, at the time parliament votes on the target figure for the SNF, which be- 
comes binding for the subsequent budget process, there is practically no notion 
of the means to attain it, and therefore, of whether it is realistic (Alesina, Mare, 
and Perotti 1995). 
Both chambers have a limited right to add to or modify proposed revenue 
and expenditure (item 2a: 4). Parliament can increase expenditures as long as 
they are covered by  additional revenues (Alesina, Mare, and Perotti 1995). 
According to our respondent a score of 4 on item 2b would be appropriate, as 
parliament nowadays sets itself lines of conduct that must be followed during 
the budget sessions. Our outside expert was less optimistic here. While parlia- 
mentary amendments must leave the state deficit unchanged, any additional 
spending being covered by  offsetting expenditure cuts or additional revenues 
(copertura),  this safeguard can be circumvented by way of parliament propos- 
ing higher spending to be implemented by local government and other external 
agencies (e.g., social security funds). Thus, extra general government spending 
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(item 2b: 0).  Both our respondent and expert agreed that accepted amendments 
can lead to the fall of a government (item 2c: 4 instead of 0). Voting is mixed 
(item 2d: 2). 
Constraints (von  Hugen Score A3: 2.50; Our Survey: 2.50). Multiyear budgets 
are based on commitments. They reflect proposed government policy with re- 
spect to the new budget and its multiyear consequences (OECD 1995). Targets 
are formulated in terms of the debt ratio and the deficit (item la: 2; item 5d: 
3). Although there are no differences with respect to the von Hagen survey, our 
respondent has the impression that the constraints have become more rigid as 
a consequence of the EMU criteria. 
Transparency of the Budget (von  Hagen Score A4: 1.00; Our Survey: 0.80).  As 
follows from the description of the budgetary process, there are various doc- 
uments at various stages (item 3b: 0). The budget is hardly transparent (item 
3c: 0), and there is no link provided with the national accounts (item 3d: 0). Gov- 
ernment loans to nongovernment entities are not included (item 3e: 0 instead 
of 4), but special funds are, according to our respondent and expert (item 3a: 
4 instead of  1). 
Flexibility during  Execution of  the Budget (von  Hagen Score A5: 0.25; Our 
Survey:  1.58). Ministries are not subject to a cash limit (OECD 1997) (item 
4b: 0). Transfers are only possible within departments according to both re- 
spondent and expert (item 4d: 4 instead of 0). There are only limited ways to 
carry over unused funds to the next year (item 4f 1.33 instead of 0). Unspent 
appropriations  are “carried  over” (up to two years for current expenditure, 
three years for public works, and five years for capital spending). As a result, 
annual cash budgets for the state are based on preliminary evaluations of car- 
ryovers that tend to be underestimated. Reliable estimates of carryovers are not 
available before March (OECD 1997). Changes in the budget require a new 
law (item 4e: I). 
Relationship with Other Parts of  Government (von  Hagen Score A6: 1.33; Our 
Survey: 2.66). Italy is a unitary state. There are three layers of  government: 
state or central level, regional and provincial level, and municipalities. The 
provincial level is by  far the smallest in financial terms. Although there has 
been a slight increase in fiscal autonomy during the last years, the respondent 
to our survey found that lower-level governments have limited autonomy. 
Sweden 
The budgetary process of Sweden went through a reform. Any differences 
in coding in  comparison  to the situation  at the beginning  of the  1990s are 
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try of Finance (Swedish Ministry of Finance 1995) and information provided 
by  Per Molander. 
Position of  Minister of  Finance (Former  Score Al: 1.00;  New Score 1.75).  The 
cabinet is involved at all stages of the budget process, although the negotiations 
on expenditure as a rule are held between the MF and the responsible ministry 
(item Id: 4). Late in April, the government presents a revised Budget Bill, 
summing up the various bills presented after the Budget Bill and containing a 
revised economic policy and budget statement, a revised revenue estimate, a 
revision of the economic survey presented in the Budget Bill, the multiyear 
budget projections, and the three-year economic policy assessment. With re- 
spect to item lb, it was stated that previously a standard bottom-up procedure 
was  applied (0), but that after the reform the cabinet will decide on budget 
norms to be proposed by  the minister of  finance (3 instead of 0). The MF 
cannot block expenditures during the budget year (item 4a: 0), nor does he or 
she have to approve disbursement (item 4c: 0). 
Position of  Legislature (Former Score A2: 1.60; New Score: 3.20). Parliament 
has one chamber (Riksdag). By constitutional law, parliament has to approve 
the budget before the start of the fiscal year. Parliament has unlimited rights to 
propose amendments both before and after the reform (item 2a: 0), and these 
were not required to be offsetting previously (item 2b: 0), but they are since 
1996 (4). Budget decisions can cause the fall of the government both in the old 
and the new procedure (item 2c: 4). Voting is chapter by chapter (item 2d: 4). 
There is a global vote on total budget size, which used to be final only (item 
2e: 0), but is since 1996 initial (4). 
Constraints (Former  Score A3: 0.50;  New Score: 4.00).  A frame budget process 
has been adopted in parliament, which is in effect from 1996 onward. In the 
spring of  1995, a nominal, multiannual expenditure ceiling for the public sec- 
tor was proposed in the economic spring bill, a proposal endorsed by  parlia- 
ment. With the expenditure ceiling in place, constraints are even more binding 
than the most restrictive alternatives (item la was 0, now 4). Before the re- 
forms, the degree of commitment to planning constraints was limited to inter- 
nal orientation (item 5d: 1); after the reform there is strong political commit- 
ment (4). 
Transparency of  the Budget (Former Score A4: 1.00; New Score: 3.20). With 
respect to the transparency of the budget, it appears that only some special 
funds were included (item 3a: l), but that now all special funds are included 
(4). Before the reform, the budget was not submitted in one document (item 
3b: 0), but now it is (4). According to the respondent, the budget was pre- 
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to national accounts are not supplied (item 3d: 0). Government loans to non- 
government entities used to be recorded by the National Debt Office in a sepa- 
rate document (item 3e: 2), but are now included in the budget (4). 
Flexibility during Execution of the Budget (Former Score A5: 1.68; New Score: 
2.02). There were no cash limits before (item 4b: 0). They will be tested in 
some areas, although not where third-party obligations are binding. According 
to our respondent this implies a score of  4, but here we disagree. Transfers 
between chapters require the consent of parliament and the MF both before 
and after the reform (item 4d: 2.4) The same applies to changes in the budget 
decision (item 4e: 3). Carryover possibilities used to be limited (item 4f 1.33), 
but now also require the consent of MF (2.66). 
Relationship with Other Parts of  Government (Former Score A6: 0.00; New 
Score: 1.33). Sweden is a unitary state. There are three layers of government: 
the state or central government, county councils, and municipals. The latter 
two supply the bulk of public consumption (regional: health care; municipal: 
schooling, care for children and elderly), and have a constitutional right to tax 
the citizens in order to finance this production.  Social security expenditures 
outside the budget consist mainly of supplementary old-age pensions, a pay- 
as-you-go system that is currently being transformed into a sort of  simulated 
premium-reserve system. A golden rule requirement will be in effect as of 1999 
for both the municipal and regional levels. Lower levels of government have 
relatively large autonomy. 
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